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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AFTER HOPE v. PELZER: IS "CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED" ANY MORE CLEAR?
Leah Chavis*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last four decades, civil rights litigation has burgeoned.' "Liti-
gants have discovered new 'federal rights,"' 2 and the growth in federal pro-
tection of civil rights has created docket pressure in the federal courts. 3 Our
government increasingly assumes more duties that affect industry, occupa-
tions, and society in general. With this vast expansion of governmental ac-
tivity, increasing abusive behavior and unethical conduct are inevitable. The
tort liability of public officers who violate the constitutional rights of our
citizens becomes of ever widening importance. Without civil liability for
public officials, citizens' rights will become increasingly curtailed. There-
fore, a private cause of action to vindicate constitutional rights is essential to
ensure that government agents are held accountable to private citizens and
to the law.
Recognizing the significance of accountability, Congress, in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 ("Section 1983"), created a civil cause of action for deprivation of
rights providing the following:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
4
* B.A. 1994, University of Arkansas at Fayetteville; J.D. 1999, University of Arkan-
sas at Little Rock; former law clerk for the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Arkansas.
1. Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the
Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 741 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 742. In 1960, only 287 civil rights cases were filed in the federal system. See
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Reports of the Judicial Conference, in AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 232 (1960). By 1977, 13,113 cases (not including 8,235
prisoner cases) were filed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Reports of the
Judicial Conference, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 189 (1977). By 1984, 21,219 civil
rights cases (not including 18,856 prisoner cases) were filed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, Reports of the Judicial Conference, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
143, 145 (1984).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Although the language of the statute does not suggest any type of im-
munity from liability for damages and specifically states that "every person
... shall be liable" to the person wronged, the United States Supreme Court
has declared that state officials are entitled to a defense of "qualified immu-
nity."5 As this article will later discuss in detail, the qualified immunity doc-
trine was created by the Supreme Court as a type of "social insurance
scheme that protects civil rights violators from the consequences of uncer-
tainty in the law,"6 on the ground that public interest requires bold govern-
ment decisions and actions,7 and without some grant of immunity, those in
public service would be inhibited in their decision making for fear of per-
sonal liability for damages and involvement in extended litigation. Essen-
tially, qualified immunity excuses public officials from liability for some
behavior that violates citizens' civil rights as long as the official's actions
do not violate clearly established law and another reasonable official would
have acted in the same manner under the circumstances.
In spite of the Supreme Court's attempt to strike a balance between
citizens' rights to be free from government abuse and the government's
right to be free from frivolous lawsuits, the doctrine of qualified immunity
has been misread, spun, twisted, and continues to be the subject of severe
abuse by the judiciary and government officials. In light of accountability,
the evolution of qualified immunity has produced such a liberal and favor-
able interpretation for officials and has produced such confusion in the
lower courts that it has threatened to overcome the plaintiff before the com-
plaint can even be drafted. Indeed, courts have been very verbal about their
confusion as to the meaning of "clearly established law" and the manner in
which it should be analyzed. 9 Does qualified immunity mean a case identi-
cal to yours has to have been previously adjudicated? Or does it mean the
5. See infra Part I.A for a discussion on the historical events leading up to the birth of
qualified immunity and the standards under which qualified immunity is applied.
6. Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of
Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
479, 479 (1994). The Supreme Court has also stated that qualified immunity works to temper
the number of frivolous suits being filed against public officials in federal court. In Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 (1983), Justice Rehnquist stated:
The staggering effect of § 1983 claims upon the workload of the federal courts
has been decried time and again. The torrent of frivolous claims under that sec-
tion threatens to incapacitate the judicial system's resolution of claims where
true injustice is involved... [t]here is a limit to what the federal judicial system
can bear.
7. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974).
8. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining the purpose of
qualified immunity as a protection against liability for public officials unless the official's
conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known").
9. See infra notes 58-64.
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Supreme Court has to have previously considered your exact facts? With so
many new and different circumstances having been pled, and with no clear
guidance by the Supreme Court, the courts have been at a loss as to how to
approach the defense. In light of the confusion, it is obvious that the courts
would rather keep a lid on litigation than cause it to explode; thus, qualified
immunity has slowly been molded into a steel shield for officials, instead of
a sword for victims of civil rights abuse. In other words, since the introduc-
tion of qualified immunity, undue protection has been available to "all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'
0
But should the public not have reasonably high expectations? The pub-
lic obviously has an interest in establishing a high standard of competence
for public officials, yet the qualified immunity defense has always militated
against this expectation of competency by forcing plaintiffs to prove that
which is rarely provable. 1 Recently, however, in the case of Hope v. Pel-
zer,12 it appears the Supreme Court finally recognized the injustice of the
formidable standard imposed by qualified immunity by holding that estab-
lished law no longer need be so clear before an official will be deemed to
have violated it. Indeed, the Court held that established law need only give
"fair warning" to officials that their conduct is unconstitutional, and fair
warning can be supplied by cases without materially similar facts. 13
Is the Hope decision a seeming victory for civil rights plaintiffs every-
where? Did Hope effectively eliminate the doctrine of qualified immunity,
thus holding public officials liable for conduct that previously would have
been excused under the "clearly established law" standard? Has "[q]ualified
immunity jurisprudence ... been turned on its head," as stated by Justice
Thomas at the beginning of his dissent in Hope?'4 Or has Hope exacerbated
the existing confusion in the lower courts as to when and how the doctrine
of qualified immunity applies?
This article explores the history of qualified immunity and its requisite
standards before and after Hope v. Pelzer. Part II will discuss the history,
evolution and creation of qualified immunity, with emphasis on the confu-
sion initially created by the doctrine in the lower courts. Part III will explore
the Court's decision in Hope and its impact on the lower courts, with Part
IV taking a brief look at cases in the Eighth Circuit in which Hope was ap-
plied.
10. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
11. See infra Part II.B for a discussion on the formidable hurdles plaintiffs face in dem-
onstrating that the law allegedly violated was clearly established and that the defendant offi-
cer should have known of the violation.
12. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
13. Id. at 740-41.
14. Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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II. THE CONCEPTION AND BIRTH OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: JUDICIAL
CREATIONS
Just as the Constitution does not mention Section 1983 or provide a
cause of action against government officials for civil rights violations, it
does not mention the concept of qualified immunity. The defense is a judi-
cial doctrine that evolved through a series of cases before the Supreme
Court in response to the abundance of frivolous suits filed under Section
1983 during the 1960s and 1970s. History reveals, however, that the framers
of the statute never intended for the statute to evolve into the immunity-
riddled black hole it has become through years of misinterpretation.
A. The Birth of Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 stemmed from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, otherwise
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.' 5 It was enacted and "specifically designed
to halt a wave of lynchings of African-Americans that had occurred under
guise of state and local law."' 16 The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of
"[S]ection 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action
be executive, legislative, or judicial.""' 17 The Court then began to strip the
immunities granted under common law by giving Section 1983 a broad
meaning-by including the majority of public officials regardless of their
status within the government. The expanding interpretation, however, began
to produce a breeding ground for Section 1983 litigation.'8 By the late
1960s, the tides began to turn in favor of the government and the Court be-
gan to regain its grip on the reins of section 1983's interpretation. The door
of redress, once again, began to close on civil rights plaintiffs everywhere.
As early as 1967, in Pierson v. Ray, 19 the Supreme Court recognized
what the Second Circuit had recognized in 1949, that the fear of being sued
"would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irrespon-
15. H.R. REP. No. 105-323, pt. 1, at 23 (1997). Section 1983 was originally passed as
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
16. H.R. REP. No. 105-323, pt. 1, at 23 (1997).
17. Matasar, supra note 1, at 741; see also Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445
U.S. 622, 622 (1980) (holding that there is no "good faith" defense for municipalities in
Section 1983 actions); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980) (interpreting the words "and
laws" broadly by stating that they are not limited to civil rights or equal protection laws);
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658-59 (1978) (holding that municipalities are
"persons" within the meaning of Section 1983).
18. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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sible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties., 20 It was here that the
Court established a type of qualified immunity. 21 Although the Court did not
express the standard in terms of qualified immunity, it held that the "defense
of good faith and probable cause, . . . available to the officers [at] common
law . . . for false arrest and imprisonment, [was] also available [to police
officers] in [an] action under § 1983. "22 Although the officers in Pierson did
not claim any type of immunity-only that they were not liable because
they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a
statute they believed to be valid-the Court, nonetheless, made an immunity
determination.23
The Court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity if
they had acted in good faith and with probable cause; however, the standard
created confusion and was difficult to apply by other courts "because a de-
termination that the officials had probable cause meant that the arrests
would have been lawful and the officials would have no need to assert
qualified immunity as an affirmative defense., 24 This opened the door for
the Supreme Court to revise the standard that would eventually evolve into
the doctrine of qualified immunity.
In two important cases following Pierson, the Court completed its re-
vision of the qualified immunity standard. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,25 the Court
considered immunity from personal liability of officers of the executive
branch of government for their role in the Kent State tragedy.26 The Court
20. Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581.
21. In Pierson, police officers had arrested a group of black ministers for allegedly
violating a state statute that prohibited congregating in a public place under circumstances
that would cause a breach of the peace. 386 U.S. at 549-50. The ministers contended the
statute was unconstitutional and that the officers had arrested them because they had used a
waiting room designated for whites only, and not because of evidence that the ministers were
planning to breach the peace. Id. at 557.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immu-
nity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV.
61, 70 (1989).
25. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
26. The plaintiffs were personal representatives of the estates of students who were
killed on the campus of Kent State, an Ohio state-controlled university. Plaintiffs brought
suit for damages under Section 1983 against the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of
the Ohio National Guard, various other Guard officers and enlisted members, and the univer-
sity president, charging that the officials, acting under color of state law, "intentionally,
recklessly, willfully and wantonly" caused an unnecessary Guard deployment on the campus
and ordered the Guard members to perform illegal acts resulting in the students' deaths. Id. at
232. The only evidence regarding the Governor's role consisted of two proclamations issued
by him describing the conditions at Kent State and calling the Guard to duty. Id. at 235-36.
The court of appeals, on the basis of these proclamations, and the notion that since the Gov-
ernor was being sued in his official capacity and that the actions were therefore in effect
2004]
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attempted to dispel the confusion created by Pierson by implying that the
term "probable cause" was commensurate to "reasonable" belief. Justice
Burger wrote:
[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief
[that the action taken was appropriate], that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of offi-
cial conduct.27
Justice Burger's explanation is essentially a two-pronged test. The first
prong represents an objective element, which requires the defending officer
to demonstrate that his belief in the appropriateness of his action was cor-
rect compared to what another reasonable officer would have believed un-
der the same circumstances. The second prong represents a subjective ele-
ment that requires the officer to demonstrate that he personally had a good-
28faith belief in the appropriateness of his action under the circumstances.
The separate objective and subjective nature of the two-pronged test enun-
ciated in Scheuer was explicitly recognized one year later in Wood v. Strick-
land.
29
In Wood, several students brought a Section 1983 suit against school
administrators for allegedly violating their constitutional rights during an
expulsion proceeding. 30 The court of appeals and the district court disagreed
over which immunity standard should be applied-the objective standard or
the subjective standard.3 ' The district court applied a subjective standard to
the school officials' immunity claims, instructing the jury that a showing of
malice, defined as ill will, was necessary for the students to prevail.32 In
other words, the students had to show that the officials knew their actions
were inappropriate. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that specific
intent to harm was not a requirement for the recovery of damages. Instead, it
applied an objective test that inquired whether the defendants had acted in
good faith in light of the circumstances. 33 The Supreme Court held the ap-
against the State and barred by the Eleventh Amendment, affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the Governor. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court remanded the case
after finding that the documents were inadequate to determine the appropriateness of immu-
nity. Id. at 249-50.
27. Id. at 247-48.
28. Id.
29. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
30. Id. at 309-10.
31. Id. at 310-11.
32. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 248 (W.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, re-
manded in part, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).




propriate standard to contain elements of both the objective and subjective
tests. The Court noted that:
[t]he official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is
doing right, but an act violating a student's constitutional rights can be
no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law
on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives than
by the presence of actual malice.
34
For seven years, the qualified immunity standard followed the Wood v.
Strickland test. In 1982, however, the Supreme Court took a devastating
turn when it decided to eliminate the subjective portion of the test and in-
sisted that the lower courts apply the objective portion to all Section 1983
cases. This unfortunate decision occurred in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.35
B. In the Wrong Direction: The Harlow Standard of Qualified Immunity
In Harlow, the Supreme Court substantially changed the Wood stan-
dard by eliminating the subjective element of the good-faith defense. This
change meant that the Court was willing to grant qualified immunity even
when the official knew his conduct was violative as long as a reasonable
officer under the same circumstances would not have known that the actions
were unlawful. The Court noted that the subjective element of the defense
had frequently proved incompatible with the admonition that "insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial ... [since] an official's subjective good
faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have re-
garded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury" and hence, could not be
decided on motions for summary judgment. 36 The Court believed this to be
an important reason to eliminate the subjective element of the defense be-
cause summary judgment would alleviate the "costs of trial" and the "bur-
dens of broad-reaching discovery" facing officials who had been subject to
suits based on "bare allegations of malice.,
37
Two decades of various interpretations, however, culminated in a
qualified immunity standard that was not so clear after all. Holding that
"government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known," 38 the Supreme Court left unresolved
some very serious issues.
34. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
35. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
36. Id. at 815-16.
37. ld. at 817-18.
38. Id. at 818.
2004]
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First, although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must
be pled,39 once pled, it is the plaintiffs burden to show that the clearly es-
tablished law is just that-clearly established.40 This requirement means the
plaintiff has two hurdles to jump in order to prevail: the judge has to find
the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and that a
reasonable officer could not have believed the conduct at issue was lawful.
41
That standard, however, raises even more difficult questions. What is
clearly established law? Who is the reasonable officer? Would any self-
respecting officer in the same situation really defend the conduct as reason-
able? What happens to malice or intent-based claims? Under the Harlow
standard, how can Section 1983 encompass all types of claims and circum-
stances? Would the lower courts not reach seemingly contradictory and
absurd results?
C. Clearly Established Law Under Harlow
The initial problem and ultimate issue in deciding whether a govern-
ment official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether he reasonably
should have known that his actions would violate someone's specifically
established federal rights. In other words, the problem is determining
whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation. Of all the constitutional standards and interpreta-
tions existing today, there is at least one constitutional prohibition that is so
well known and so frequently defended that the law is always considered
clearly established--discrimination on the basis of race. 42 The remaining
constitutional standards remain to be clearly established.
Neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal court has provided
bright-line rules that may be used to determine whether a specific federal
right has been clearly established. The federal courts have criticized the
objective standard for being vague and have noted that "there are no bright
lines for deciding whether the law's treatment of particular conduct at any
given time" is clearly established.43
Of course, the Supreme Court, being the final authority on constitu-
tional interpretation, can determine what is clearly established law. The
39. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
40. Id. at 641.
41. Id.
42. Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the general right
to be free from such invidious discrimination is well established and "that all public officials
must be charged with knowledge of it"). In Flores, two Mexican-Americans showed that
they were discriminated against based on their race and national origin because of a delay in
receiving requested liquor licenses. Id.
43. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1126 (5th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 26
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problem, however, arises when specific rights are alleged in light of the
particular constitutional amendment. The availability of the qualified im-
munity defense depends on an analysis of whether the courts have decided
that a particular right is included within the protection of a general constitu-
tional provision. An official's knowledge of a general constitutional provi-
sion does not always tell him whether a proposed action will violate that
general provision, and therefore, he will not be required to pay damages
unless the particular federal right allegedly violated was clearly established
at the time he acted. The plaintiff must make an almost impossible showing
that his facts have been previously adjudicated and are clearly established.
In other words, the plaintiff would have to show clearly established prece-
dent that is absolutely fact-specific. 44 What is the likelihood of someone
else's clearly decided case being identical to yours? The chances are slim
that this kind of fact-dependent precedent would be found. Because the law,
therefore, would rarely be considered "clearly established," the official
would almost always be entitled to qualified immunity.
One appalling case that illustrates this problem is Todd v. United
States.45 In Todd, a Bivens action46 was filed "against IRS agents for dam-
ages arising out of a penalty imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 67 02 ."47 The plain-
tiff, Donna Todd, filed a federal income tax return and an amended return
for 1982.48 Below the [portion of the return that provides for the taxpayer's
signature and declaration of oath], she typed "signed involuntarily under
penalty of statutory punishment. ' 49 The IRS assessed a penalty against her
under the premise that the additional statement invalidated the tax return.
50
44. The Seventh Circuit, in discussing the meaning of clearly established rights, has
suggested that the right can rarely be considered "clearly established," at least in the absence
of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276
(7th Cir. 1986).
45. 849 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1988).
46. This was named for the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that a victim of a constitu-
tional violation by a federal agent, acting under the color of his authority, has the right to
recover damages. Id. at 397. After Bivens, thousands of Bivens-type cases flooded the courts,
prompting Congress to amend the Federal Tort Claim Act "to provide a statutory damages
remedy against the United States government in all Bivens-type FTCA actions provided that
the employee acted within the scope of his employment." Mark Drooks, Statutory Comment,
H.R. 2659: Amending the FTCA, 17 Harv. J.L. 357, 359 (1980). As an aside, however, many
legal scholars, including Mr. Drooks, feel the FTCA is riddled with holes and protects the
government rather than compensating victims of misconduct. Id.
47. Todd, 849 F.2d at 366. The code cited provides for penalties against anyone who
basically conducts himself in an unreasonable manner in order to delay or impede the ad-
ministration of federal income tax laws by including information that, on its face, indicates
that the self-assessment is substantially incorrect. See Id. at 367 n.3.





Because Todd did not pursue the judicial remedies set out in the tax code,
the IRS attached her property and her bank account and filed a tax lien
against her.5'
Todd filed suit in district court alleging violation of various constitu-
tional rights, claiming that her return was complete and accurate and that the
IRS improperly assessed the penalty.52 She provided all information neces-
sary to process her return and claimed no frivolous deductions.53 Thus, Todd
did not satisfy either of the prerequisites contained in the penalty statute.54
Although Todd prevailed at the district court level and the government con-
ceded her point, the IRS still fought her in court by claiming that its conduct
in assessing the penalty did not contravene clearly established constitutional
rights because no court had held that the conduct at issue violated a tax-
payer's First and Fifth Amendment rights. 55 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he IRS agents entrusted with section
6702's enforcement were not experienced in or familiar with the parameters
of that provision" because it had been in effect for less than a year and that
the agents, therefore, did not violate Todd's clearly established rights and
were entitled to immunity.56
The court overlooked the fact that the First and Fifth Amendments had
been established for over 200 years. Further, the IRS agents should be well
versed in that which they are hired to manage, whether the provision is a
day old or has been in effect since the agency began. Of all the whimsical
things people do to express their dissatisfaction with politics, no two will
ever be exactly alike so that those who file constitutional violation suits will
never get past the pleading stage. Fact-specific pleading creates a very seri-
ous problem.
There are two further problems surrounding the "clearly established"
standard. First, government officials may become guarded in their actions
for fear of liability on those matters that have been clearly established.
Thus, officials will tend to be overly cautious with the clearly established
standard because they will act as if some principles of law are clearly estab-
lished which, in fact, are not. In other words, with such a mutating standard,
an officer might not know what is clearly established from day to day. So,
in order to avoid liability, he will over-comply, i.e., be overly cautious, and
avoid actions that he thinks are clearly established, when, in fact, he could
have, and possibly should have, acted.57
51. Id.
52. Id. at 367-68.
53. Todd, 849 F.2d at 368.
54. Id. at 367-68.
55. Id. at 368.
56. ld. at 371.
57. For an in-depth discussion on overcompliance see Mandery, supra note 6.
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More seriously, a standard that permits so much variation will also
permit officials trying to abide by that standard to exercise a low level of
care. Without bright-line rules, the official cannot be charged with knowl-
edge of what is clearly established from day to day, and this leaves the offi-
cial with virtually absolute immunity. There is no incentive for the official
to study the law because what he would study is disputed. Further, if the
Supreme Court is the final authority on what is clearly established, an offi-
cer who has been sued can claim that the law he acted under was not clearly
established, even if it was established in the circuit in which he is employed.
This situation lowers the standard too far and prevents lower courts from
reaching even remotely congruous results.
Because the exact definition of "clearly established" has not been es-
tablished, courts have been known to reach seemingly contradictory results.
Some circuits have concluded that courts should look to all available deci-
sional law to determine whether the right was clearly established.5 8 Some
give deference to the Supreme Court, although other courts may play a role
in what is clearly established. 59 Some courts, such as the D.C. Circuit, ap-
pear to be at a total loss as to the manner in which to approach the meaning
of "clearly established., 60 This type of uncertainty and self-regulation
6'
leads to inequitable administration of laws. A plaintiff in one circuit may
prevail, whereas a plaintiff in a neighboring circuit may not.
6
1
58. See, e.g., Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Absent binding
precedent, we look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and
district courts, to determine whether the right was clearly established.").
59. See, e.g., Hughes v. City of N. Olmsted, 93 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1996) ("In de-
termining whether a constitutional right was clearly established we look first to the decisions
of the Supreme court, then to decisions of this Court and other courts within our Circuit, and
finally to the decisions of other Circuits.").
60. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is not clear, for
example, how a court should determine well-established rights: should our reference point be
the opinions of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, District Courts, the state courts, or
all of the foregoing?"); see also, Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (noting that "clearly established law" is difficult to define).
61. It is important to note that in 1994, in Elder v. Holloway, the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that, in determining whether a government official's conduct violated clearly
established law, an appellate court should consider all relevant precedents and not just those
presented in plaintiffs brief. 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994). This, however, seems to be just a
suggestion because courts are not bound by what another circuit or federal district is doing
with respect to a provision of law. The Supreme Court obviously is asserting that it would be
best to look at the entire picture in order to make a judicious decision regarding qualified
immunity.
62. For example, in Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1992),
the plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee who attempted suicide by hanging, claimed that the city
officials were at fault for physical damage resulting from a lack of oxygen. Upon discovering
the detainee hanging in his cell, the officials called the local fire department for assistance
instead of cutting down the detainee themselves. Id. at 1093-94. The Sixth Circuit noted the
2004] 609
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As illustrated, courts follow different guidelines in determining clearly
established law. By allowing Section 1983 and Bivens defendants to inter-
pose such distinctions, courts defy common sense in order to distinguish
which laws are clearly established.63 As noted by one observer,
A [government] attorney's option in any case is to argue that there is no
decision by any court that addresses the specific constitutional rights al-
legedly violated. If some federal court has decided a case that deals with
the specific right, the best option is to argue that the case was decided by
a court that is not binding on the sued [government] official. In either
event, the federal right allegedly violated [will not have been] clearly es-
tablished at the time of the alleged violation, and the [government] offi-
cial [will be] immune from liability for damages.
64
The Eleventh Circuit allowed this approach in Hope v. Pelzer 65 when
it affirmed summary judgment for the individual defendants in a shocking
case of prison brutality.66 Hope opened the door for the Supreme Court to
take a much needed look at the Harlow standard of qualified immunity.
III. HOPE V. PELzER: A NEW STANDARD AND A NEW BALANCE?
REVISITATION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE
In 1995, Larry Hope, then an inmate in Alabama's Limestone Prison,
was twice handcuffed to a hitching post for disruptive conduct. The first
occurrence was for a two-hour period in May, during which time he "was
offered drinking water and a bathroom break every fifteen minutes." 67 Hope
was handcuffed above shoulder height, and when "he tried moving his arms
to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists, causing him pain
and discomfort."
68
general right of a pre-trial detainee to adequate medical care, but the court refused to recog-
nize as clearly established the more particularized right of a detainee "to be cut down by
police officers when discovered hanging in a jail cell." Id. at 1097. Yet, two years later in
Hare v. City of Corinth, the court stated, "pretrial detainees are often entitled to greater pro-
tection than convicted persons . . . [and] jail officials were under a clearly established consti-
tutional duty to respond to [the] pretrial detainee's serious medical needs . .. [which in-
cluded] respond[ing] immediately when [the detainee] was discovered hanging." 22 F.3d
612, 615 (5th Cir. 1994).
63. See Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Michael R. Smith, Qualified Immunity from Liability for Violation for Federal
Rights- a Modification. 14 SCH. L. BULL. 8, 8-9 (Jan. 1983).
65. 240 F.3d 975 (1lth Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
66. ld.at981.
67. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733-34 (2002).
68. Id. at 734.
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In June of the same year, Hope was again handcuffed to the hitching
post after an altercation with a guard at his chain gang's worksite.69 Before
being handcuffed to the post, however, Hope was ordered to remove his
shirt, thus exposing himself to the sun.7 ° Unlike the previous occurrence,
however, Hope remained on the post for seven hours, was given only one or
two water breaks, no bathroom breaks, and was taunted by a guard who
gave water to dogs in Hope's presence and "spill[ed] the water on the
ground" instead of giving it to him.7
Hope initially filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against eight prison guards
in the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that the use of the hitching
post was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment.72 The trial court dismissed claims against five of the guards and
granted summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity to the
remaining three.73 Although the magistrate who rendered the decision did
not determine whether the use of the hitching post was unconstitutional,74
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court and answered the constitutional
question, finding that while the hitching post's use for punitive purposes-
as opposed to behavior control-violated the Eighth Amendment, Hope
could not demonstrate, as required by circuit precedent, that the federal law
by which the guards' conduct should be evaluated was established by cases
that were "materially similar" to the facts in his own case. The guards were
thus granted qualified immunity.
75
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit utilized the standard set forth in
Harlow, stating that the standard "look[s] to whether a reasonable official
could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly estab-
,,76lished law and the information possessed by the official at the time ....
The court interpreted the standard to mean that clearly established law must
be demonstrated by circuit cases with facts that are "materially similar" to
the case at. bar.77 Although Hope proffered Gates v. Collier78 and Ort v.
White,79 which dealt with inmates being handcuffed to a fence8 ° and de-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 734-35.
71. Id. at 735.
72. Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (11 th Cir. 2001).
73. Id.
74. Hope, 536 U.S. at 735.
75. Hope, 240 F.3d at 981-82.
76. Id. at 981 (quoting Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 995 (1 1th Cir.
1995)).
77. Id.
78. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The case found several forms of corporal punishment
impermissible, including handcuffing inmates to fences or cells for long periods. Id. at 1306.
79. 813 F.2d 318 (1 1th Cir. 1987). The case warned that "physical abuse directed at [a]
prisoner after he terminate[s] his resistance to authority would constitute an actionable
2004]
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prived of water after refusing to carry the water keg to the worksite,81 re-
spectively, the court distinguished the cases on minor factual distinctions
and thus determined that no binding precedent had been established in the
Eleventh Circuit.82
Hope appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court
granted certiorari. 8 In its decision reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Court
concluded that the lower court's approach was too rigid and that it applied
the "materially similar" requirement of the clearly established law analysis
too narrowly. 84 The Court explained that the term "clearly established" does
not mean that the "very action in question [must have] previously been held
unlawful" before the official is stripped of qualified immunity.85 The Court
relied heavily on United States v. Lanier86 to explain that officials can still
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances as long as the officials have "fair warning" that their conduct
is unconstitutional.87 The Court further explained that, as held in Lanier,
"fair warning" did not require a showing of fundamentally similar cases, but
that even cases with "notable factual distinctions" could possibly place a
reasonable official on notice that his actions were unconstitutional.88 Indeed,
the Court specifically noted that "the ... precedent of Gates and Ort ... put
a reasonable officer on notice that the use of the hitching post under the
circumstances alleged by Hope was unlawful., 89 The Court further noted
that under the "fair and clear warning" standard, Gates and Ort were "suffi-
cient to preclude the defense of qualified immunity at the summary judg-
ment stage." 90 The Court thus rejected the Eleventh Circuit's requirement
that cases be materially similar before satisfying the clearly established
standard and stated that the proper analysis would require an examination of
whether the guards had "fair warning" that their conduct violated Hope's
constitutional rights. 9'
[E]ighth [A]mendment violation." Id. at 324.
80. Gates, 501 F.2d at 1306.
81. Ort,813F.2dat320-21.
82. Hope, 240 F.3d at 981. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Gates because the deci-
sion was based on the prison's unconstitutional "maintenance, operation and administration."
Id. The court distinguished Ort because the inmate was denied water only until after he per-
formed his job duties. Id.
83. Hope v. Pelzer, 534 U.S. 1073 (2002).
84. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
85. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535, n.12 (1985)).
86. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
87. Hope, 536 U.S. at 740-41.
88. Id. at 740 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269).
89. Id. at 745-46.
90. Id. at 746.
91. Id. at 741.
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What does all of this mean for qualified immunity? Should the lower
courts interpret the decision as the beginning of the end of the doctrine or
''simply an admonition to the Eleventh Circuit not to be so harsh or rigid in
its analysis? '92 The lower courts' interpretation and application of the
Court's instruction in Hope remains to be seen. The Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, appears to be attempting a fair application of Hope..
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF HOPE
A review of recent rulings rendered by the Eighth Circuit reveals that
the court is taking great pains to follow the instructions of the Supreme
Court in Hope. For instance, in the recent case of Meloy v. Bachmeier,93 the
court, citing Hope, noted that "[t]o be clearly established, a right's contours
must be clear enough that a reasonable official would understand his or her
conduct was unconstitutional,' '94 and that the correct standard is a "flexible"
one, "requiring some, but not precise factual correspondence with prece-
dent, and [application of] general, well-developed legal principles. 95 The
court further stated that it looks "to all available decisional law, including
decisions from other courts, federal and state, when there is no binding
precedent in [the Eighth] [C]ircuit." 96 The court concluded by recognizing
that "[a]lthough earlier cases need not involve fundamentally or materially
similar facts, the earlier cases must give officials 'fair warning that their
alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.' 97
The court made similar references to Hope in Treats v. Morgan,
98
Hawkins v. Holloway,99 McCoy v. City of Monticello,'00 Shade v. City of
Farmington, Minnesota,'0' and Hill v. McKinley.0 2 In all but the latter case,
the Eighth Circuit not only acknowledged Hope as the appropriate standard
in a qualified immunity analysis, but followed the Supreme Court's instruc-
tions and made a proper application. 0 3 The Eighth Circuit's compliance
with Hope should give hope to this circuit's civil rights plaintiffs.
92. Christopher D. Balch, Is There Hope After Hope? Qualified Immunity in the Elev-
enth Circuit, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1305, 1309-10 (2003).
93. 302 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 848 (citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40).
95. Id. (quoting Burton v. Richmond, 276 F.3d 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2002)).
96. Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001)).
97. Id. (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
98. 308 F.3d 868, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2002).
99. 316 F.3d 777, 788 (8th Cir. 2003).
100. 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003).
101. 309 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2002).
102. 311 F.3d 899, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2002).
103. In Hill, the court found that defendant officers violated the privacy rights of Hill, a




The state of qualified immunity remains to be seen. While Hope v. Pel-
zer14 is a seemingly landmark decision in this area of law sometimes re-
ferred to as constitutional torts, one has to remember that our courts-the
interpreters of our laws-are guided by some of the most brilliant minds in
our legal system. Brilliant minds never think alike. In the law, what quacks
like a duck and walks like a duck, is not necessarily a duck at all. Hence,
what is considered to be "fair warning" in one circuit might be perceived as
something wholly different in another. One thing is certain: having a provi-
sion that at least attempts to redress the wrongs committed by our govern-
ment against our citizens is not to be taken for granted. At least we have the
opportunity to address the problems complained about in this article.
spread-eagle position," for a period of three hours after the officers perceived her as a safety-
risk. Hill, 311 F.3d at 901-02. The court, however, granted the officers qualified immunity,
thereby reversing the district court, because of Supreme Court precedent "direct[ing] that the
lower courts not take too broad a view of what constitutes clearly established law." Id. at 904
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Although the court acknowledged
Hope, it summarized its perception of the appropriate standard by stating that while a case
"need not be on all fours" with precedential cases, it "must be sufficiently analogous to put a
reasonable officer on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional." Id. at 904 (citing Meloy
v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002)). In a scathing dissent, Judge Hansen noted
that the Supreme Court had recently "reiterated the test for determining whether the law was
'clearly established' for the purpose of granting qualified immunity" and that "[u]nder this
analysis, a court must ask whether the state of the law gave the officers 'fair warning' that
their conduct was unconstitutional." Id. at 910 (Hansen, J., dissenting) (citing Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). Judge Hansen then applied the relevant case law to conclude that
the officers, in fact, were not entitled to qualified immunity due to clearly established law
demonstrating that the officers' conduct was unconstitutional. Id. at 910-11 (Hansen, J.,
dissenting).
104. 534 U.S. 1073 (2002).
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